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by Luis Rey Los Santos




Natural resources represent a good opportunity for economic growth and development
in many resource-rich countries. However, not all these countries have beneted from
the wealth stemming from natural resources. The empirical evidence shows that the
economic performance of many resource-rich countries is poorer than the average. This
has come to be known as the "natural resource curse". The interesting questions are why
do some countries perform badly despite their natural wealth, what are the mechanisms
that cause lower growth rates and how can they be avoided.
Dierent arguments have been proposed to explain the natural resource curse. Some
authors claim that resource abundance elicits corruption and rent seeking. Others ar-
gue that the high volatility of commodity prices lead to macroeconomic volatility, and
volatility harms economic growth. However, the soundest explanation for the natural
resource curse is based on the notion of the Dutch disease.
The rst chapter of the thesis analyses the mechanism behind the Dutch disease. The
extra wealth generated by the sale of natural resources induces an appreciation of the
real exchange rate and a corresponding contraction of the traded sector. If we consider
that most of the economic growth is caused by technological progress acquired through
"learning-by-doing" (LBD) which is mainly present in the traded sector, a temporary
decline in that sector may imply lower economic growth.
A number of oil producing countries have attempted to avoid the Dutch disease through
stabilization funds. The second chapter of the thesis analyses the economic consequences
of stabilization funds. These funds permit oil producing countries to adjust government
spending and cushion the domestic economy from the sharp and unpredictable variations
in oil prices and revenue.
Given that natural resources are exhaustible, the last chapter of the thesis looks for an
optimal revenue distribution between current and future generations. Previous models
based on the permanent-income hypothesis are enriched, including essential features of
resource-rich countries, productive government spending and Dutch disease eects.
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Natural resources represent a good opportunity for economic growth and development
in many resource-rich countries. However, not all these countries have beneted from
the wealth stemming from natural resources. The empirical evidence shows that the
economic performance of many resource-rich countries is poorer than the average. This
has come to be known as the "natural resource curse". The interesting questions are why
do some countries perform badly despite their natural wealth, what are the mechanisms
that cause lower growth rates and how can they be avoided.
The empirical evidence suggesting that there is a negative link between natural resources'
revenue and economic growth, is very large. One of the rst studies that analyzes cross-
country evidence for the natural resource curse, was by Sachs and Warner (1995). In
their work, they analyzed the period between 1970 and 1989, and showed that resource-
rich countries grew, on average, one percentage point less during this period. The
results appear robust, given that they remain signicant even after controlling for a large
number of variables such as GDP growth, openness in policy, investment and human
capital accumulation. However, other studies claimed the need to control for additional
variables, especially, the eciency of government institutions. Sachs and Warner (1997)
show that the negative link between natural resource abundance and growth, remains
signicant even after controlling for institutions' quality. The adverse eects of resource
abundance on economic growth survive even after allowing for geographical factors such
as distance to closest airport, percentage of land in tropics or incidence of malaria (Sachs
and Warner, 2001).
1
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Other authors have also provided cross-country evidence and proved the natural resource
curse; Sala-i-Martin (1997), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Arezki and van der
Ploeg (2007), Gylfason et. al. (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Busby, et. al. (2002),
etc.
1.1 The Dutch disease
Dierent arguments have been proposed to explain the natural resource curse. Some
authors claim that resource abundance elicits corruption and rent seeking. Others ar-
gue that the high volatility of commodity prices lead to macroeconomic volatility, and
volatility harms economic growth. However, the soundest explanation for the natural
resource curse is based on the notion of the Dutch disease. The idea behind the Dutch
disease is that the extra wealth generated by the sale of natural resources induces an
appreciation of the real exchange rate and a corresponding contraction of the traded sec-
tor. If we consider that most of the economic growth is caused by technological progress
acquired through "learning-by-doing" (LBD) which is mainly present in the traded sec-
tor, a temporary decline in that sector may imply lower economic growth. There is
microeconomic evidence supporting the assumption of learning-by-doing externalities in
the traded sector. Van Biesebroeck (2005) nds that the productivity of manufacturing
plants in African countries increases after entering export markets. Blalock and Gertler
(2004) show that Indonesian rms become more productive by learning through export-
ing. Fernandes and Isgut (2005) present evidence of "learning by exporting" by young
Colombian manufacturing plants between 1981 and 1991. Figure 1.1 shows how the
non-oil external current account has evolved compared to the oil revenue in some oil
exporting countries (Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria and Ecuador). We can see a negative
correlation between these two variables. Periods of high oil revenue are usually followed
with non-oil current account decits. One way to explain this fact is that an increase
in oil revenue causes a real exchange rate appreciation. Non oil exporters nd it more
dicult to trade their goods; hence, there is a decline in the traded sector. This is the
main idea behind the Dutch disease.
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Figure 1.1: Non-oil current account and oil revenue
1.2 Stabilization Funds
Resource rich countries are exposed to sudden increases or decreases in commodity prices
or discoveries of new reserves. This can lead to boom and bust cycles. There exists
empirical evidence that the high volatility of commodity prices in the world market has
negative eects on growth performance in resource-rich countries (van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke, 2007). There is also cross-country evidence that real exchange rate volatility
can harm productivity in the long-run, especially in countries with low levels of nancial
development (Aghion, et. Al, 2006).
A number of oil producing countries have attempted to address these issues through
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stabilization funds. The purpose of these funds is to adjust government spending and
cushion the domestic economy from the sharp and unpredictable variations in oil prices
and revenue. Oil producing countries such as Norway, Venezuela, Oman and Kuwait
have adopted dierent types of stabilization funds. However, the experience of oil funds
has been very dierent across countries. While Norway and Kuwait have achieved to
isolate government spending from oil revenue, government spending in Venezuela and
Oman has a high correlation with oil revenue.
In 1990, Norway established the State Petroleum Fund (SPF). The objective was to
create a mechanism to insulate non-oil economy from windfall oil revenue. According
to the SPF policy, the assets are invested in a range of foreign nancial assets and only
the return from the assets can be used for government purchases.
The SPF can be considered a successful tool for managing oil resources. The following
gure shows the percentage change in government spending and oil revenue in Norway.
We can observe that the SPF has achieved its objective; government spending has kept an
independent path from oil revenue. Actually, government spending growth rate has been
almost constant over time. On the other hand, oil price volatility led to sharp increases
and decreases in oil revenue. In 2000, Norwegian government more than doubled the
revenue stemming from oil, however public spending did not increase signicantly.
Figure 1.2: Oil revenue and public spending in Norway
Venezuelan experience with stabilization funds has been very dierent. In 1998, Venezuela
established a Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (MSF). The objective was very similar
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
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to Norwegian State Petroleum Fund. The fund was created to insulate the government
budget and the economy from 
uctuations in oil prices.
The mechanism that drives Venezuelan fund is dierent from the Norwegian. The
Venezuelan fund focuses on short-term stabilization. A share of oil revenue is saved
when oil price is above a reference value, and withdrawals are made when it is below
this value. Although in the rst year the fund had transparent rules, important modi-
cations were introduced in 1999. The most important one is the president's ability to
withdraw money from the fund without approval by Congress.
The gure below shows the high correlation between the government's oil revenue and
public spending. Oil price volatility led to government spending increases and decreases.
While, in Norway, high oil prices in 2000 did not aect public spending, Venezuelan
government increased expenditure by 50
Figure 1.3: Oil revenue and public spending in Venezuela
In contrast to these countries, there have been other resource rich countries which have
not established stabilization funds. For e.g., Mexico where oil revenue represents 30
percent of total government revenue. Mexico has not adopted any rule, and therefore,
oil revenue is spent under government discretion. We can see that the consequences for
Mexican economy have been negative. Government spending has followed a similar path
to oil revenue. Periods of high oil prices implied high growth in public spending.
It is well known that volatility is bad for growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995). This is
especially true for resource-rich countries, where government income is dependent on
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Figure 1.4: Oil revenue and public spending in Mexico
resource revenue. Stabilization funds have been considered the best way to address the
problems caused by high volatility.




The Dutch Disease in a
dependent economy with
intersectoral adjustment cost for
capital
The notion of the Dutch disease has been the most widespread explanation for the
poor economic performance of some resource-rich countries. Empirical evidence shows
that resource bonanzas lead to real exchange rate appreciations and consequently, a
decline of the non-oil traded sector. When we consider that the traded sector bene-
ts from "learning-by-doing" externalities, natural resource booms imply lower growth
rates. Previous literature on the Dutch disease is based on two sector models where
perfect mobility of the production factors is assumed, and thus, the real exchange rate
is determined by the world interest rate and technology. We enrich previous models by
adopting a dynamic framework with intersectoral adjustment cost for capital. Under
this approach, in the short run, the real exchange rate is no longer fully determined by
the supply side and does not adjust instantaneously.
7
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2.1 Introduction
Natural resources are an important source of revenue for many developing countries.
What could actually represent an opportunity to enhance economic growth, natural
resources have surprisingly become a curse in many countries. The empirical evidence
has shown that some resource-exporting countries experience lower growth rates in the
long-run1. Most of the arguments that have been proposed in the various literature to
explain this phenomenon are based on the notion of the Dutch disease. The idea behind
the Dutch disease is that the extra wealth generated by the sale of natural resources
induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a corresponding contraction of the
traded sector. If we consider that most of economic growth is caused by technological
progress acquired through learning-by-doing (LBD) which is mainly present in the traded
sector, a decline of that sector may imply lower economic growth (Corden and Neary,
1982; Corden, 1984).
There is substantial microeconomic evidence supporting the assumption of LBD exter-
nalities in the export sector of developing countries. For example, Van Biesebroeck
(2005) nds that productivity of manufacturing plants in African countries increase af-
ter entering export markets. Blalock and Gertler (2004) show that Indonesian rms
become more productive by learning through exporting. Fernandes and Isgut (2005)
present evidence of \learning by exporting" by young Colombian manufacturing plants
between 1981 and 1991.
While there are numerous theoretical analyses of the Dutch disease eects, they have
largely used partial equilibrium and static frameworks. Most of the models have also
ignored the dynamics of the real exchange rate. Previous works on the Dutch disease
usually assume that, while it is costly to convert new output to capital, it is costless to
transform one form of existing capital to another. That is, capital is perfectly mobile
between the traded and non-traded sector. One consequence of this assumption is that
there is not impact of resource booms on the real exchange rate. In fact, the real exchange
rate, the wage and the capital intensities are pinned down by the world interest rate and
technology (Sachs and Warner, 1995).
1See, for instance, Auty (2001), Sachs and Warner (1995).
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This paper tries to enrich previous models of the Dutch disease adopting a dynamic
framework with intersectoral adjustment cost for capital. We investigate the conse-
quences of a resource boom in an economy with costly sectoral reallocation of capital
between non-traded and traded sectors. For this purpose, we follow the framework de-
veloped by Morshed and Turnovsky (2003), where they assume that the movement of
capital across sectors involves convex intersectoral adjustment costs. In this way, the
real exchange rate is now subject to transitional dynamics, and thus, it is not determined
by the interest rate. After an increase in natural resource revenues, the stock of capital
can not adjust immediately, and consequently the real exchange rate appreciates. We
also assume that capital is produced only in the non-traded sector, and we abstract from
adjustment costs associated with aggregate capital formation.
Just like Sachs and Warner (1995), we employ an endogenous growth model where the
source of growth is labor-augmenting technological progress. The key assumption is that
the accumulation of knowledge is only generated in the traded sector. However, not only
the traded sector benets from the technological progress but also the non-traded sector.
Thus, if an increase in natural resource revenues leads to a decline of the traded sector,
the economy will experience lower growth rates.
The framework which we use is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
three sectors and two factors of production. The sectors are oil, traded and non-traded.
We assume that production of oil requires no factor inputs, and can be sold in the world
markets at an exogenous world price. This model makes no distinction between resource
booms that occur because of discoveries or because of increases in resource prices.
The two factors of production are labor and capital. Labor can move freely between
sectors but not internationally. Capital is obtained in the non-traded sector, and has
a cost attached to transfer it from one sector to the other. Households can borrow
internationally at the real interest rate. We assume that world capital markets assess an
economy's ability to service debt costs and the associated default risk, the key indicator
of which is the country's debt-output ratio.
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
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2.2 Dependent economy with costly intersectoral adjust-
ment of capital
We consider a small open economy with a large number of identical innitely lived
households and a large number of identical rms. The typical household consumes both
non-traded goods, which are produced in the non-traded sector, and traded goods, which
are produced either at home or abroad. Households provide labor at the competitive
wage to rms in both the traded and the non-traded sectors. They also accumulate
capital that they rent to production rms.
Therefore, three goods are produced in the economy, non-traded goods, traded goods
and oil. Production of oil requires no factor inputs, and all its production is exported.
Prices of traded goods, including oil, are determined internationally.
Following Morshed and Turnovsky (2003), we assume that the traded good is used only
for consumption, while the non-traded good can be either consumed or converted into
capital. We further assume that the capital stock does not depreciate and that it can
not move freely across sectors. Only non-traded output can be converted into capital,
and once it becomes capital good in the non-traded sector, it can be transferred to the
traded sector under some adjustment cost. Thus, capital accumulation in the economy
is described by,
KTt+1   KTt = Xt (2.1)







where X is the amount of capital transferred from the non-traded to the traded sector,
and I is the amount of output that is not consumed in the non-traded sector, and
therefore, converted into capital. The coecient h > 0 parameterizes the degree of the
sectoral adjustment cost. In order to provide X units of capital to the traded sector,
the amount of capital in the non-traded sector must be reduced by more than X. This
excess amount, hX2=2KN, represents the intersectoral adjustment costs.
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We assume inelastic supply of labor. Moreover, labor is perfectly mobile across sectors
and the labor market always clears. Thus, the following equation would hold good all
the time
LT + LN = 1 (2.3)
where LT and LN are the labor employed in the traded and non-traded sector, respec-
tively. Notice that we normalize the total amount of labor to one.
2.2.1 Firms producing tradables
The representative rm in the traded sector employs labor and capital in a Cobb-Douglas




where A is labor-augmenting technological progress. Firms in the traded sector operate
under perfect competition. Their decision is to choose capital and labor allocation KT
and LT to maximize the rms prots in units of tradables. Prots maximization behavior
implies the following equations:
(1   )K
TtAt (AtLTt)
  = wt (2.5)
K 1
Tt (AtLTt)
1  = RTt (2.6)
where the price of traded goods is normalized to one, and RT represents the return
on capital employed in the traded sector. Equation (2.5) and (2.6) describe demand
for labor and capital inputs in the traded sector. The marginal product of the labor
employed in the traded sector equals the wage rate in the economy, w.
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2.2.2 Firms producing non-tradables
The representative rm in the non-traded sector also employs capital and labor in a







The rm chooses capital and labor allocation KN and LN, to maximize the rms prots
in units of tradables, under a perfect competitive market. Thus, demand for labor and
capital inputs are described in the following equations:













 = RNt (2.9)
where p is the price of non-traded goods, i.e., the real exchange rate. Given that labor
is mobile across sectors, the wages paid in the both sectors are equal.
2.2.3 Households
The representative household is endowed with a xed amount of labour (normalized to
be one unit), which sells at the competitive wage, w. She also accumulates capital that
rents to production rms, and may borrow internationally on a world capital market.
Moreover, the entire income generated from oil extraction, Ot is distributed among
households.
Accordingly, the households budget constraint is:
Dt+1   Dt = rtDt   wt   RNtKNt   RTtKTt + PtCt + ptIt   Ot (2.10)
where D is the total debt held by households, C is the consumption index of traded
goods and non-traded goods and P is the consumption price index. Households take the
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 2. The Dutch Disease in a dependent economy with intersectoral adjustment
cost for capital 13
given oil revenue, O. To sustain an equilibrium of on-going growth, oil revenues must
be tied to the scale of the economy
Ot = otYt
where Y is the total output2, and o is the oil-output ratio, which is an exogenous,
stochastic variable.
ot = Ot (2.11)
where
log(t) = log(t 1) + t (2.12)
Thus, the typical household chooses, in the rst stage, consumption level C and the






subject to the budget constraint (2.10) and capital accumulation constraints (2.1) and




t = Et[t+1(1 + rt+1)] (2.14)








2In the total output we include the production of oil, thus Y = YT + pYN + O
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along with capital accumulation (2.1)-(2.2), and the budget constraint (2.10). Where
 is the shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds and, N
and T are the shadow values of one unit of capital stock in the non-traded and traded
sector respectively.
Equation (2.13) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of
wealth. Thus, the Lagrange multiplier measures the increase in household utility as-
sociated with one additional unit of real wealth. Equation (2.14) is a Euler equation
that determines intertemporal allocation, it equates the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in consumption to the real rate of returns to bonds. Combining equations







where p = N= and q  T= represent the market price of capital in terms of the for-
eign bond in the non-traded and traded sector respectively. Equation (2.17) determines
the rate at which capital is transferred between the two sectors. There is a positive (neg-
ative) transfer from the non-traded sector to the traded sector when the market price of
capital in the traded sector is above (below) the price of capital in the non-traded sector.
There is no capital transfer across sectors when prices are equal in both sectors. Notice
that in absence of adjustment cost, h = 0, the market price of capital must be equal in
the non-traded and traded sector, q = p. Plugging equation (2.15) into equations (2.17)










Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 2. The Dutch Disease in a dependent economy with intersectoral adjustment

















Equations (2.20) and (2.21) state the pricing conditions for capital in the traded and
the non-traded sectors, respectively. The revenue from selling one unit of capital today
must be equal to the discounted value of renting the unit of capital for one period and
then selling it, net of adjustment costs. It is straightforward to demonstrate that, in
the absence of adjustment cost, the return on capital must be equal in the non-traded
sector and the traded sector, RN = RT.
On the other hand, in the second stage, given total consumption index, households decide
the share of non-traded and traded goods of their consumption basket. Consumption
index is a Cobb-Douglas function of non-traded goods and traded goods, C = C
TC1 
N






PC = CT + pCN (2.23)
From the rst order conditions, we obtain the optimal demand for traded and non-traded
goods,
CT = PC pCN = (1   )PC (2.24)
We can also rewrite the consumption-price index as a function of the price of the non-
traded goods,
P = p1  (2.25)
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 2. The Dutch Disease in a dependent economy with intersectoral adjustment
cost for capital 16
2.2.4 Current account
In this section, we derive the current account of the economy,
Dt+1   Dt = rtDt   YTt + CTt   Ot (2.26)
and thus, we prove that the Walras' law is satised. The starting point is the households
budget constraint, equation (2.10),
Dt+1   Dt = rtDt   wt(LTt + LNt)   RNtKNt   RTtKTt + PtCt + ptIt   Ot
Applying zero prot condition for rms and decomposing consumption expenditure, that
is,
YTt = RTtKTt + wtLTt
pYNt = RNtKNt + wtLNt
PtCt = CTt + ptCNt
we obtain,
Dt+1   Dt = rtDt   ptYNt   YTt + ptCNt + CTt + ptIt   Ot
Finally, we apply the market clear condition in the non-traded sector, pYN = pCN +pI.
In this way we obtain equation (2.24).
2.2.5 Learning by Doing (LBD) and borrowing premium
Following other models on the Dutch disease, we adopt the same LBD mechanism as
Sachs and Warner (1995). Productivity growth is driven by the labor employed in the
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traded sector, and benets not only the traded sector but also the non-traded sector.
Thus, the dynamics of productivity A are
At+1   At
At
= a + bLTt (2.27)
where the parameter b  0 measures the strength of the LBD eect, and a is the
constant value of productivity growth. As in the earlier literature, the LBD eect is
external to rms, the underlying assumption being that each rm is too small to take
its own contribution to LBD into account.
On the other hand, we assume that the interest rate that households face is a function
of the country's debt-output ratio3.
rt = r
t + f(Dt=Yt) f0 > 0 (2.28)
where r is the exogenously given world interest rate. This assumption implies that
capital markets asses an economy's ability to service debt costs and the associated default
risk. The endogenized risk premium assumed in this model rules out the nonstationary
behavior of consumption and the current account presented in unrestricted small open
economy models. Other authors such as Turnovsky (1997) have previously adopted this
assumption 4.
2.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The steady-state equilibrium has the characteristic that all real quantities grow at the
same constant rate, g, and the relative prices of capital in the non-traded and traded
sector, p and q, are constant. Thus, we express the dynamics of the system in terms
of the following stationary variables, kT  KT=Y , kN  KN=Y , c  C=Y , d  D=Y ,
x  X=Y and, LN, LT, p and q.
3The functional specication of the upward sloping curve that we use is: r = r
 + e
zD=Y   1. Thus,
in case of a perfect world market, when z = 0, r = r
, the world interest rate.
4Other methods used in the literature include nitely-lived households, transaction costs in foreign
assets and endogenous discount factor, see for further discussions of these methods Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2002).
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Thus, the equilibrium of the economy is a sequence of prices ftg = fwt;rt;pt;RNt;RTtg





























is a solution to the
representative household's problem;






is a solution to the
problems of representative rms in both the non-traded and traded sector;
(3) given a sequence of quantities ftg and a sequence of shocks, ftg clears the market:
(i) Labor market:







(iii) Non-traded goods sector:
pYNt = pCNt + pINt (2.31)




(v) Balance of payments:
Dt+1   Dt = rtDt   YTt + CTt   Ot (2.33)
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2.4 Calibration
Due to the complexity of the model, we will employ numerical methods to examine the
eects of oil shocks. We begin by calibrating a benchmark economy, selecting parameter
values that are, as close as possible, consistent with the main features of a representative
small open economy. The time unit is one quarter.
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
 0.35 capital share in traded sector

 0.25 capital share in non-traded sector
r 0.01 world interest rate
 0.5 consumption prefenrence
o 0.15 oil-output ratio
z 0.04 risk borrowing premium
 0.973 discount rate
h 30 adjustment cost
a 0.0025 constant value of growth
b 0.0125 learning-by-doing
The benchmark parameter choices of the model are described in Table 2.1, while Table
2.2 reports macroeconomic ratios implied by the theoretical model.
Our choice for the discount factor,  and the world interest rate, r, are standard in
the literature. For the key parameters of the model, we follow Morshed and Turnovsky
(2003). Thus, we set the share of the traded goods in the consumption portfolio,  = 0:5.
We assume the standard assumption that the traded sector is more capital-intensive than
the non-traded sector, and chose the value of the capital share in traded and non-traded
sectors,  and 
, equal to 0.25 and 0.35 respectively. One of the key parameters of
the model is adjustment cost, h. As Morshed and Turnovsky (2003) argue, adjustment
cost in this model is dierent from the standard adjustment cost parameter in aggregate
investment models. The cost of converting one existing form of capital into another is
more costly than converting new output into capital. Thus, we also set h = 30 as the
benchmark value for our dynamic analysis. However, we also analyse the dynamics for
dierent values of h.
Another important parameter in the model is the one that establishes the benets from
learning-by-doing, b. In a study for Indonesian rms Blalock and Gertler (2004) nd
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strong evidence that rms experience an annual increase in productivity of about 2 to 5
percent immediately after the initiation of exports. Van Biesebroeck (2003) nds similar
results in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, we establish an annual increase in productivity of
5 percent for new workers in the traded sector, b = 0:0125. The other parameter
a = 0:0025 is chosen to ensure a plausible growth rate.
The borrowing premium a = 0:03 is chosen to ensure a plausible national debt. Finally,
we assume that oil production represents a 15% of total production in the economy,
o = 0:15.
Table 2.2: Structure of the theoretical economy
Capital in traded sector/GDP 2.2872
Capital in non-traded sector/GDP 2.9615
External debt/GDP 62%
Consumption/GDP 83%
Investment in traded sector/GDP 2%
Investment in non-traded sector/GDP 4%
Employment in non-traded sector/Total Employment 64%
Employment in traded sector/Total Employment 36%
Oil/GDP 15%
Quarterly growth 0.7%
2.5 Steady State properties
2.5.1 No Growth
In the absence of learning-by-doing (b=0) and exogenous growth (a=0), all real quan-
tities keep constant at the steady state. The steady state is thus described by rms
cost minimization conditions, equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.8) and (2.9), household optimum
conditions (2.13), (2.14), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21) and (2.24), the inelastic labor supply as-
sumption (2.3), the current account equation (2.26), and the risk premium condition
(2.27).
The steady state equilibrium has the characteristic of having no investment, and there-
fore, capital adjustment cost has no impact on steady state values. Consequently, from
equation (2.19), the price of capital in the non-traded and traded sector are equal. More-
over, the return on capital, expressed in terms of the foreign bond, equals the interest
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rate, RT=p = RN=p = r, equations (2.20)-(2.21). This result implies, from rms rst
order conditions, that the relative price and the capital-labor ratios can be expressed as
a function of the interest rate 5,
p = p(
 
r) KN=LN = KN=LN(
 
r) KT=LT = KT=LT(
 
r) w = w(
 
r)
The rst conclusion that we can take is that these variables are independent of oil booms.
In the long-run, the relative price of non-traded goods and traded goods (real exchange
rate) will not be aected by a permanent increase of oil revenue.
However, an oil boom raises households real income, and thus, the demand for traded
and non-traded goods. From equation (2.24), we observe that a higher total demand
leads to an increase in demand for all goods, including traded and non-traded goods.
CT = CT(
+
O) CN = CN(
+
O)
Given the market clear condition in the non-traded sector, the rise in the demand of
non-traded goods leads to increase in the production of this type of goods. It is not
possible to import non-traded goods; thus, when the real income of households increase,




To increase the production of non-traded goods, rms of the non-traded sector need to
employ more production factors, both capital and labor. Given that the labor supply is
inelastic, the rise of the labor employed in the non-traded sector implies the decline of
the labor employed in the traded sector.
LN = LN(
+
O) LT = LT(
 
O)
Therefore, in the absence of learning-by-doing (and growth) an oil shock has no impact
on the relative price of consumption goods. However, even without a price response,
5See Obstelfeld and Rogo (1996) for more detail.
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the rise in the real income leads to a higher demand in both types of goods. In order to
keep the market clear condition of the non-traded sector, a permanent oil shock causes
a permanent decline (increase)of the traded sector (non-traded sector).
Table 2.3 shows the steady state response of one percent permanent oil shock. The
left hand side of the table shows the eects on the main variables in absence of eco-
nomic growth. As we have argued above, capital-labor ratios and households wages do
not change after an oil shock. They are determined by the interest rate. Similarly,
the relative price of non-traded and traded goods is pinned down by the interest rate,
and therefore, an increase in oil revenue does not have an impact on the relative price
(real exchange rate). However, a permanent oil shock will reallocate production factors
across sectors. The higher demand in the non-traded sector implies the need to increase
production, and thus, we observe that the labor employed in this sector rises around
0:16 percent. Consequently, we observe a decline in the traded sector. The labor em-
ployed in this sector decreases around 0:26 percent. Consumption of both traded and
non-traded goods increases. However, given that the relative price does not vary, the
relative consumption rate remains constant after the oil shock.
2.5.2 Growth
When the economy benets from learning-by-doing (b > 0), the steady state equilibrium
has the characteristic that all real quantities grow at the same constant rate g. The
steady state is described by the same equations as in the previous section 2.5.1 plus
capital accumulation equations, (2.1) and (2.2) and LBD equation (2.28). The main
dierence with respect to the non-growing economy is that a permanent oil shock has
permanent eects on all variables of the economy. The right hand side of table 2.3 shows
the steady state response of one percent oil shock in a growing economy.
The mechanism behind an oil shock is very similar to that mentioned in the previous
section 2.5.1. A rise in oil revenue makes households richer. Higher income leads to an
increase in demand for all goods, including non-traded and traded goods. As demand
increases for both types of goods, production of non-traded goods must increase to clear
the market of non-traded goods. In order to increase production in the non-traded
sector, it is necessary for additional input of both capital and labor. Consequently,
labor is transferred from the traded to the non-traded sector. Given that we assume
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that the economy benets from learning-by-doing which is acquired in the traded sector,
the decline of the labor employed in the traded sector leads to lower economic growth.
In contrast to the non-growing economy, a permanent oil shock aects the growth rate




Table 2.3 shows that one percent permanent oil shock causes the rise of the labor em-
ployed in the non-traded sector of 0:16 percent, and the fall of the labor in traded sector
of 0:27 percent. Thus, given the decline of labor employed in the traded sector, the
growth rate of the economy at the steady state decreases from 2:80 percent to 2:79
percent.
On the other hand, a rise in oil revenue leads to a lower debt-output ratio. Under risk
premium assumption, Equation (2.28), the interest rate is positively correlated with





As in the non-growing economy, the relative price of non-traded goods and traded goods
is pinned down by the interest rate at the steady state. A fall in the interest rate leads
to a rise in the relative price. Table 2.3 shows that the relative price, p, increases around
0:03 percent. The rise in the relative price implies that the consumption of traded goods
with respect to total consumption, increases. Although the consumption of both traded
and non-traded goods increases after a positive oil shock, the consumption of traded
goods increases relatively more due to the rise in the price of non-traded goods.
2.6 Simulation of a natural resource bonanza
In this section, we present results of simulation of the model after an exogenous oil
shock. We do not distinguish between oil shocks stemming from a rise in oil price or a
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rise in oil production. We show the response of the main variables of the model to one
percentage increase in oil revenue.
2.6.1 Permanent oil shock in a non-growing economy
We analyse the eects of a permanent oil shock in a non-growing economy, that is, a
economy that does not benet from learning-by-doing (a=0,b=0). This case allows us to
illustrate clearly the in
uence of capital adjustment cost on the model. Figure 2.1 shows
response of the following variables to one percentage permanent increase in oil revenue:
relative price of non-traded and traded goods (real exchange rate), labor employed in
the traded sector, capital in the traded sector and household total consumption.
The dynamics of the real exchange rate depend highly on the assumption about capital
adjustment cost. In contrast to the earlier models of the Dutch disease, we allow for
intersectoral adjustment cost, that is, capital can not move freely across sectors. In
the absence of capital adjustment cost, h = 0, the real exchange rate is devoid of any
transitional dynamics; moreover, there is no response to oil shocks. The real exchange
rate is determined by the interest rate not only at the steady state but also along the
transitional path (it appreciates slightly in the short-run due to the decline in the debt-
output ratio, and therefore, in the interest rate). It is unrealistic to consider that the
real exchange rate does not react to a resource boom.
When we consider positive capital adjustment cost, h = 30, the dynamics of not only
the real exchange rate but also the main variables of the model are more realistic. A rise
in household income, stemming from the increased oil revenue, leads to an increase in
demand for both traded and non-traded goods. As demand rises for both types of goods,
production of non-traded goods must increase to restore home-market equilibrium. In
contrast to the case where capital mobility is costless, capital can not be transferred
instantaneously to the non-traded sector. To compensate the incapability of capital to
adjust instantaneously to the oil shock, the real exchange rate and labor overreact. The
price of non-traded goods rises (i.e., an appreciation of the real exchange rate) to restore
home market equilibrium.
Given that labor moves freely across sectors, labor draws out of the traded sector into
the non-traded sector. This makes it possible to increase production in the non-traded
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sector. However this is not enough to compensate the rise of the demand of non-traded
goods. Hence, we observe that the price of non-traded goods rises (i.e., an appreciation
of the real exchange rate) to restore home-market equilibrium.
Capital speed adjustment to the new steady state depends on intersectoral adjustment
cost. The higher the h is, the more time is required for that capital to reach the new
steady state. As capital decreases (increases) in the traded sector (non-traded sector),
labor moves back from the non-traded sector to the traded sector. Similarly, the real
exchange rate is gradually restored back to its long-run equilibrium value.
2.6.2 Permanent oil shock in a growing economy
In this section, we analyse the consequences of a permanent oil shock in an economy, with
intersectoral adjustment cost, which benets from learning-by-doing. Figure 2.2 shows
responses to one percentage increase in oil revenue. All variables are ratios with respect
to GDP except real exchange rate and productivity growth. Their impulse responses
are in deviation from the steady state values.
A positive oil shock leads to a conventional Dutch disease story. A permanent increase in
oil revenue implies a permanent rise in households income, and consequently, the demand
for traded and non-traded goods increases. As demand rises for both types of goods,
the production of non-traded goods must increase to restore home-market equilibrium.
However, due to capital adjustment cost, capital cannot moves freely to the non-traded
sector. Hence, in the short-run, labor employed in the non-traded sector overshoots its
long-run equilibrium. Similarly, in contrast to earlier literature on the Dutch disease
based on perfect mobility of capital, the relative price of non-traded goods (i.e., the real
exchange rate) increases in the short-run to clear the market of non-traded goods.
As capital adjusts to its long-run equilibrium, production in the non-traded sector in-
creases. Because of the rise in production, the relative price of non-traded goods fall.
Similarly, as capital moves to the non-traded sector, there is a transfer of labor from the
non-traded to the traded sector.
In the long-run, a permanent increase in oil revenue implies a permanent decline of the
traded sector and a permanent rise in the non-traded sector. There is a transfer of
production factors from the traded to the non-traded sector. Capital increases around
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0:16 percent in the non-traded sector and decreases around 0:18 percent in the traded
sector. Similarly, labor employed in the non-traded sector increases around 0:15 percent
and decreases 0:3 percent in the traded sector.
A positive oil shock causes a rise in labor employed in the non-traded sector, and thus,
the decline of labor employed in the traded sector. Based on previous models of the
Dutch disease, we have assumed that productivity growth is acquired through learning-
by-doing which is present in the traded sector. To be precise, productivity growth is
a function of the labor employed in the traded sector. Therefore, the decline in labor
employed in the traded sector, caused by the oil shock, implies a permanent decrease
in productivity growth. The dynamics of productivity growth follow the path of labor
employed in the traded sector.
We observe that there is a permanent consumption rise of almost 0.2 percent. The lower
productivity growth is not enough to oset the higher household income due to the rise
in oil revenue. The welfare of households increase with the permanent oil shock.
2.6.3 Temporal oil shock in a growing economy
In this section, we analyze the consequences of a temporal oil shock ( = 0:7) in an econ-
omy with intersectoral adjustment cost which benets from learning-by-doing. Figure
2.3 shows responses to one percentage increase in oil revenue. All variables are ratios
with respect to GDP except real exchange rate and productivity growth. Their impulse
responses are in deviations from the steady state values.
As expected, a temporal oil shock causes temporal eects on the main variables of the
model. After the oil shock there is a decline of the traded sector. A higher household
income leads to a higher demand of both types of goods. To restore home-market
equilibrium there is a transfer of production factors from the traded to the non-traded
sector. Intersectoral adjustment cost causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
As the shock diminshes, all variables return to their steady state equilibrium.
Therefore, the decline of the labor employed in the traded sector is temporal and con-
sequently, the eects on productivity growth are also temporal. Households income is
aected negatively by the lower productivity growth however, the increase in oil revenue
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is high enough to cause a rise in the household total income. Hence, households enjoy
higher consumption rates.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we try to enrich previous models of the Dutch disease adopting a dynamic
framework with intersectoral adjustment cost for capital. We analyze the consequences
of positive oil shocks in an economy with and without adjustment cost for capital.
We show that by adding adjustment cost for capital to the model, the dynamics of the
main macroeconomic variables are more realistic. After an oil shock, the higher demand
for non-traded goods causes the appreciation of the real exchange rate and, consequently,
the decline of the traded sector. When we consider that economic growth is driven by
learning-by-doing acquired in the traded sector, the decline of the traded sector after an
oil shock implies lower growth rates for the future.
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Table 2.3: Steady State Response to a permanent oil shocks
No Growth (a=0,b=0) Growth (h=30)
o=0.15 o=0.1515 o=0.15 o=0.1515
KT=LT 30.2827 30.2827 - -
KN=LN 18.7464 18.7464 - -
w 2.1445 2.1445 - -
p 1.3742 1.3742 1.2608 1.2612
D=Y 0.4398 0.4398 0.6160 0.6157
CT=C 0.5861 0.5861 0.5614 0.5615
CN=C 0.4265 0.4265 0.4453 0.4452
YT=Y 0.3561 0.3546 0.3346 0.3332
YN=Y 0.3594 0.3594 0.4088 0.4086
LT 0.3846 0.3836 0.3601 0.3591
LN 0.6154 0.6164 0.6399 0.6409
g - - 2.8004% 2.7959%
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Figure 2.1: Temporary 1% increase in oil-output ratio. No growth (no LBD)
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Figure 2.2: Temporary 1% increase in oil-output ratio. With LBD
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Figure 2.3: Permanent 1% increase in oil-output ratio. With LBD







The economic performance of resource-rich countries has been very unequal in the last
few decades. While some economies have beneted from the extra wealth stemming
from natural resources, others have suered the so-called resource curse. Previous lit-
erature highlights the process of de-industrialization caused by the appreciation of the
real exchange rate as an explanation of the natural resource curse. Others attribute
the poor economic performance to the volatility generated by natural resource revenue.
One of the measures adopted in some countries to avoid the resource curse has been
the creation of stabilization funds. We develop a two-sector small open economy DSGE
model to study the eects of resource booms under dierent scal strategies. We show
that stabilization funds can help to moderate both real exchange rate appreciations and
macroeconomic volatility caused by resource booms.
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3.1 Introduction
Although there are resource-rich countries that benet from their natural wealth, the
economic performance of many other resource-rich countries has been very poor in the
last few decades. Oil exporting countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela have experienced
lower growth rates than less oil-dependent developing countries. This paradox has been
the theme in many empirical analyses. For example, Sachs and Warner (1995) shows
that resource-rich countries grow on average about one percentage point less during
1970-891.
There have been several approaches in earlier literature to account for the resource
curse. The most important one is associated with the notion of the Dutch disease2.
The idea behind the Dutch disease is that the extra wealth generated by the sale of
natural resources induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a corresponding
contraction of the traded sector. If we consider that most of the economic growth is
caused by technological progress acquired through learning-by-doing which is mainly
present in the traded sector, a temporary decline in that sector may lower growth.
Other authors claim that the adverse eects of natural resources on the economy may
also result from sensivity to volatility of commodity prices in the world market. Natural
resource revenues tend to be very volatile, because the supply of natural resources ex-
hibits low price elasticity. It is well known that volatility is bad for growth, investment
and income distribution (e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aizenman and Marion, 1999).
3
Natural resources are the largest source of government revenue in many countries. Most
of them are highly dependent on this revenue, hence the economic performance of these
countries depend on the way their natural resources are managed. Previous literature has
focused on explaining why resource wealth may have a negative impact on the economy.
Little attention has been given to the question of how the government should respond
to resource booms. This chapter tries to explain how dierent policies lead to dierent
outcomes.
1Other articles in the literature that provide empirical evidence about this fact are Sachs and Warner,
2001; Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Gylfason et. al., 1999; Busby
et al., 2002
2See for instance Corden and Neary, 1982; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Torvik, 2001
3Other approaches to the resource curse have to do with the rent-seeking activities.
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Oil sector is a very important source of revenue for the governments of countries such
as Norway, Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, etc. For instance, in Mexico and Norway, the
oil sector contributes around 30 percent of the total government revenue. This means
that oil price shocks have important consequences for the economies of these countries.
However, these two countries have managed oil revenue in very dierent ways. Figure
3.1 shows how government expenditure has responded to changes in oil revenues in
Norway and Mexico. While Norway has managed to isolate government expending from
oil revenue, Mexico's gure shows a high correlation between these two variables.
Unlike Mexico, Norway adopted a stabilization fund in 1990 (State Petroleum Fund) to
shield the economy from oil price 
uctuations. According to the Fund policy, all Fund
assets are invested in a range of foreign nancial assets and only the return from the
Fund can be used for government purchases. Consequently, temporary oil booms had
not direct eects on the economy, most of the money is put into the Fund, and the
economy benets from permanent higher returns from the Fund.
The State of Alaska provides a dierent example in managing oil revenue. Like Norway,
a stabilization fund (Alaska Permanent Fund) was created in 1978 to deal with the
volatility of oil revenues. In contrast to Norway, the returns generated by the Fund
are not transferred to the government but to the households (The Permanent Dividend
Program). Thus, since 1982, every Alaskan receives a transfer from the Fund returns.
In order to illustrate the consequences of oil booms under dierent scal regimes, we
construct a two sector small open economy DSGE model. We assume that production
of oil requires no factor inputs, and all its production is exported at an exogenous world
price. This model makes no distinction between resource booms that occur because
of oil discovery or because of price increase. Both the traded and non-traded sectors
require labor and capital for production.
We assume that oil revenue is appropriated by the government and analyze three dierent
policies/cases. In the rst case, government uses oil revenue to increase its consumption.
In the second case, a Fund is created and only the returns on the Fund are used for
government consumption. In the last case, a Fund is created and the returns on the
Fund are transferred to households. The purpose is to evaluate the impact of an oil
shock in these three scenarios, especially to observe how the real exchange rate and the
traded sector are aected. We show that under a stabilization Fund, the eects of oil
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shocks are smoothened. In the short-run, the real exchange rate appreciates less and
the decline of the traded sector is lower. Furthermore, the impact on the traded sector
is permanent. This implies that a stabilization fund, like the one adopted in Norway
and in the State of Alaska, diminishes the eects related to the Dutch disease.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model. Section
3.3 discusses the implications of three dierent scal policies. Section 3.4 concludes.
Figure 3.1: Oil revenue and government expenditure in Mexico and Norway
3.2 The model
We construct a two-sector model of a small open economy. Three goods are produced:
a non-traded good, a traded good and oil. We assume that production of oil requires
no factor inputs, and all its production is exported at an exogenous world price. Our
model assumes competitive markets in the non-traded and traded sector. The price of
the traded good is xed in the world markets, and normalized to one.
Production of traded and non-traded goods requires labor and capital. Labor is supplied
by the households inelastically, and can move instantaneously between sectors within
the economy. Labor mobility implies that workers earn the same wage in either sector.
Capital is accumulated by households and rented to rms. Capital accumulation is
subject to adjustment cost.
3.2.1 Households
Households consume both traded and non-traded goods. Total consumption is specied
by the following Cobb-Douglas function
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 3. Macroeconomic Aspects of Stabilization Funds in Resource-Rich Countries 37
Ct = C
TtC1 
Nt 0 <  < 1 (3.1)
where CTt and CNt are consumption of traded and non-traded goods respectively. The
parameter  measures the share of traded goods in total consumption. Households will
choose non-traded and traded goods to minimise expenditure. Demand for non-traded
and traded goods is then




CTt = PtCt (3.3)
where, Pt = p1 
t , is the implied consumer price index, and pt is the price of non-traded
goods (the price of traded goods is normalized to one)4.
The representative household consumes the aggregate consumption, C, yielding utility







 > 0; 0 <  < 1 (3.4)
where  is the discount factor and 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The representative consumer also accumulates physical capital which is rented to traded
and non-traded rms. Capital investment implies adjustment costs specied by the
quadratic convex function








Capital stock depreciates at the rate, , so that its net rate of accumulation is
4See Obstelfeld and Rogo (1996) for more detail.
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Ki;t+1 = Ii;t + (1   )Ki;t i = N;T (3.5)
Investment in new capital requires traded and non-traded goods in the same mix as
household's consumption basket. Thus, the price of a unit of investment, in either
sector, is Pt.
Households also have access to the world capital market, allowing them to borrow in-
ternationally. We assume that the world capital market assesses the economy's ability
to service its debt costs, and views the country's debt-output ratio as an indicator of its
default risk. Thus, the borrowing rate is of the form:
r(D=Y ) = r + f(D=Y ) f0 > 0 (3.6)
where r is the exogenously given world interest rate, D is the total foreign debt in the
economy and f(D=Y ) is the country-specic borrowing premium that increases with
the country's debt-output ratio5. The endogenized risk premium assumed in this model
rules out the nonstationary behavior of consumption and the current account presented
in such unrestricted small open economy models6.
The representative consumer chooses consumption, and the rates of capital and debt
accumulation, to maximize intertemporal utility, equation (3.4), subject to the capital
accumulation, equation (3.5), and the budget constraint
Dt+1 Dt = rtDt wt RTtKTt RNtKNt+PtCt+Pt	(IT;KT)+Pt	(IN;KN)+Tt (3.7)
where D is the stock of debt of the representative consumer, w is the wage, Ri i = T;N
represent the return on capital in the traded and non-traded sector and T denotes lump-
sum taxes. In performing this optimization, the agent takes the borrowing rate, r, as
given.
5Since we are focusing on debtor nations, we assume D > 0. However, it is possible for D < 0 in
which case the households accumulates credit by lending abroad
6Other methods used in the literature include nitely-lived households, transaction costs in foreign
assets and endogenous discount factor, see for further discussions of these methods Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2002).
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Thus, household optimum is characterized by the following equations:
C 
t = tPt (3.8)






































+ Nt+1 (1   )
#
(3.13)
along with capital accumulation (3.5), and the budget constraint (3.7). Where  is the
shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds and, N and T are
the shadow value of one unit of non-traded and traded capital stock.
Equation (3.8) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of wealth.
Thus, the Lagrange multiplier measures the increase in household utility associated with
one additional unit of real wealth. Equation (3.9) is a Euler equation that determines
intertemporal allocation, it equates the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in
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where qT  T= and qN  N= represent the market price of capital in terms of
foreign bonds in the traded and non-traded sector respectively. Notice that, in the
absence of adjustment cost, the price of one unit of capital is equal in both sectors.
Moreover, it equals the price of one unit of consumption.

































Equations (3.16) and (3.17) state the pricing condition for physical capital in the traded
and non-traded sector respectively. They equate the revenue from selling one unit of
capital today (qi;t), to the discounted value of renting the unit of capital for one period,
and then selling it, net of depreciation and adjustment costs. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that, in the absence of adjustment cost, the return on capital must be equal
in the non-traded sector and the traded sector, RN = RT.
3.2.2 Firms
3.2.2.1 Firms producing tradables
The representative rm in the traded sector uses capital and labor in a Cobb-Douglas




where AT is a time invariant technology parameter. Firms in the traded sector operate
under perfect competition. Their decision is to choose capital and labor allocation KT
and LT to maximize the rms prots in units of tradables. Costs minimization behavior
implies the following equations:
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(1   )ATK
TtL 
Tt = wt (3.19)
ATK 1
Tt L1 
Tt  RTt (3.20)
where the price of traded goods is normalized to one, and RT represents the return on
capital used in the traded sector. Equation (3.19) and (3.20) describe the demand for
labor and capital inputs in the traded sector.
3.2.2.2 Firms producing non-tradables
The representative rm in the non-traded sector also uses capital and labor in a Cobb-








where AT is a time invariant technology parameter. The rms decision is to choose
capital and labor allocation KN and LN, to minimize the cost, under a perfect compet-
itive market. Thus, demand for labor and capital inputs are described in the following
equations:















Nt  RNt (3.23)
where p is the price of non-traded goods, i.e the real exchange rate.
3.2.3 Fiscal Policy
Government income is made up of lump-sum taxes, Tt, and oil revenue, Ot. Oil income
is an exogenous stochastic variable:
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 3. Macroeconomic Aspects of Stabilization Funds in Resource-Rich Countries 42
Ot = Ot (3.24)
where
log(t) = log(t 1) + t (3.25)
Government purchases are assumed to have no direct eect on the utility of house-
holds. The scal authority consumes the nal good, C
g
t , using the same aggregator as
households. Thus government demand for traded and non-traded goods is the following:
C
g











In this chapter, we focus on three scal strategies that can be implemented by the
government in response to a positive oil shock.
3.2.3.1 Increase in government spending
The government may use oil revenue to increase its spending. Oil windfall is employed to
increase consumption of both traded and non-traded goods. Thus, government budget
constraint is the following:
Tt + Ot = PtC
g
t (3.28)
where lump-sum taxes are constant. A positive oil shock implies higher government
consumption.
3.2.3.2 Stabilization Fund
An alternative scal policy is to create a Stabilization Fund similar to the one imple-
mented in Norway. The oil windfall is deposited in a Fund and the government receives
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the return on the Fund. The extra wealth that the government receives is used to in-
crease government consumption. Consequently, government budget constraint is the
following:




Ft+1   Ft = Ot (3.30)
where r is world interest rate and Ft is the Fund value. The return on the Fund is used
to increase government consumption, keeping lump-sum taxes constant.
3.2.3.3 Dividend Program
The third scal strategy that government may carry out is the Dividend Program
adopted by Alaskan authorities. As Norwayan Stabilization Fund, the oil windfall is
deposited in a Fund. However, the return on the Fund is not used to increase govern-
ment consumption, but to cut lump-sum taxes. That is, oil revenues is transferred to
households. Thus, government budget constraint is the following:




Ft+1   Ft = Ot (3.32)
In this case, the return on the Fund is used to cut lump-sum taxes, keeping government
consumption constant.
3.2.4 Market clearing
In each period, the non-traded goods market must clear. Thus, we have
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Equation (3.33) indicates that demand for non-traded goods comes from household
consumption, government consumption, investment in the traded and non-traded sector
and the adjustment cost.
Additionally, the labor market conditions must be satised:
LTt + LNt = 1 (3.34)
3.2.5 Calibration
Due to the complexity of the model, we will employ numerical methods to examine the
eects of oil shocks. We begin by calibrating a benchmark economy, selecting parameter
values that are, as close as possible, consistent with the main features of a representative
small open economy. The time unit is meant to be one quarter.
The benchmark parameter choices of the model are described in Table 3.1, while Table
3.2 reports macroeconomic ratios implied by the theoretical model.
We dened one period as a quarter, and thus, set the discount factor, , to 0.975, which
implies a steady state interest rate of r = 0:0256. We set the quarterly world interest
rate to r = 0:01 so that country premium is 1.56 percent. We set the risk premium
parameter a = 0:04 so that the debt-output rate of the economy is 55 percent.
We assumed the standard assumption that the traded sector is more capital-intensive
than the non-traded sector, and chose the value of the capital share in traded and non-
traded sectors,  and 
, equal to 0.65 and 0.25 respectively. We set the depreciation
rate, , at 10 percent per annum, standard value in the business cycle literature. The
value of the adjustment cost parameter, h, is set at 10.
Finally, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , to one, implying a log-
utility consumption function. The share of traded goods in the consumption portfolio is
assumed to be 0:5. The steady state value of oil income, O, is set to 15 percent to GDP.
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
 0.65 capital share in traded sector

 0.25 capital share in non-traded sector
r 0.01 world interest rate
 0.025 capital depreciaton rate
 1 inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 0.5 share of traded goods in total consumption
a 0.04 risk borrowing premium
 0.975 discount rate
h 10 adjustment cost
Table 3.2: Structure of the theoretical economy
Capital in traded sector/GDP 2.1733
Capital in non-traded sector/GDP 3.7380
External debt/GDP 55%
Consumption/GDP 88%
Investment in traded sector/GDP 5.4%
Investment in non-traded sector/GDP 9.3%
Employment in non-traded sector/Total Employment 74%
Employment in traded sector/Total Employment 26%
Oil/GDP 15%
3.3 Consequences of a temporary oil shock
In this section we analyze the impact of a one percent temporary increase in oil revenue
under three dierent scal strategies. In the rst case, government benets from the
oil shock and increases public expenditure (Increase in Government spending). In the
second case, oil revenue is deposited in a Fund, and government only receives the return
on the Fund (Stabilization Fund). In the third case, oil revenue is deposited in a Fund,
and the return on the Fund is transferred to households (Dividend Program).
3.3.1 Increase in Government spending
Firstly, we consider that the government employs the extra-oil revenue to raise pub-
lic expenditure. Figure 3.2 shows impulse responses to one percentage increase in oil
revenue. All gures are expressed in percentage terms of the steady state value.
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In the short-run we have the conventional story of a reaction to a positive demand shock.
One percentage increase in oil revenue causes a 0:6 percentage increase in government
spending. A rise in government expenditure implies a higher demand for traded and non-
traded goods. Domestic market equilibrium implies that the non-traded goods market
must clear each period. Therefore, production of non-traded goods should increase. In
order to increase production of non-traded goods, labor is transferred from the traded
to the non-traded sector. However, capital adjustment cost hampers the reallocation
of capital in the short-run; hence, the relative price of non-traded goods (i.e., the real
exchange rate) increases. When extra-oil revenue is employed to increase government
consumption, real exchange rate appreciates a 0:075 per cent.
We observe that in the short-run, the rise in government consumption has two eects
on the economy. On the one hand, the real exchange rate appreciates and, on the other
hand, the production in the traded sector declines. There is a transfer of labor and
capital from the traded to the non-traded sector. This is the conventional Dutch disease
story. An oil boom causes the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the decline of
the traded sector. If we had assumed that economic growth is caused by technological
progress acquired through learning-by-doing in the traded sector, the oil shock would
have reduced economic growth.
Even if extra-oil revenue is employed to increase government consumption, households
are also aected by the oil shock. The rise in the relative price of non-traded goods leads
to a higher marginal product of labor in the non-traded sector, and consequently, pushes
up wages. The increase in wages raises consumers income. As a result, consumption
rises and the demand for traded and non-traded increases even more.
In the long-run, the eects of the temporary oil shock disappear. As oil revenue returns
to its initial value government spending declines, and thus, the demand for non-traded
goods declines. This implies that the relative price of non-traded goods decreases. To
restore home market equilibrium, production of non-traded goods declines.
Therefore, when the government employs the extra-oil revenue to raise public expen-
diture, the eects of the oil shock are temporary. Consumption of both government
and households increase; however, the benets are temporary. The positive eects on
households are longer. The rise in households income, stemming from higher wages,
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is employed to increase consumption and reduce debt. Hence, households can prolong
consumption several periods.
3.3.2 Stabilization Fund
In this section, we consider the case where the extra-oil revenue is deposited in a Fund,
and the government receives the return on the Fund to increase government consumption.
We set an initial value of the Fund-GDP ratio of 60%. Figure 3.3 illustrates impulse
responses to one percentage temporary increase in oil revenue.
In this scenario, the rst eect of the oil boom is an increase in the Fund. The extra-oil
revenue is deposited in the Fund; hence, we observe that the value of the Fund increases
until the boom is over. One percentage temporary increase in oil revenue causes a 0:75
percentage permanent increase in the value of the Fund. A higher value of the Fund
implies a higher return for the government. Thus, a temporary oil boom has permanent
eects on government income.
The government employs extra-income to increase the demand for traded and non-
traded goods. As we have seen above, production of non-traded goods should increase
to satisfy domestic market equilibrium. In order to increase production of non-traded
goods, labor is transferred from the traded to the non-traded sector. However, capital
can not move instantaneously to the new steady state because of the costly adjustment
cost. Consequently, the relative price of the non-traded good (real exchange rate) rises
in the short-run. As capital reaches the new steady state the relative price goes back to
its initial value. Notice that, in this model, permanent demand shocks have a temporary
eect on the relative price. This is because long-run relative price behavior is determined
by changes in productivity between the traded and non-traded sector7.
The temporary rise in the relative price of non-traded goods makes the marginal product
of labor increase, and thus wages rise. Households benet from the temporary higher
income and demand more of traded and non-traded goods. In contrast to government
income, the positive eects on households income are temporary. When relative prices
adjust to the long-run equilibrium, wages decline.
7In order to generate permanent changes in the relative price, Rebelo and Vegh (1995), include an
specic factor (land) in the production of non-traded goods.
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We observe that the eects of an oil shock on an economy are softened with a Stabi-
lization Fund. In this case, the government consumption increase is lower than in the
previous case. Under a Stabilization Fund, one percentage temporary increase in oil
revenue causes a 0:02 percentage increase in government consumption. Moreover, in
contrast to the previous case, the eects on the economy are permanent. Thus, high
volatility caused by oil-shocks are avoided.
The real exchange rate appreciation (i.e., a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods)
is also lower than in the previous case. Consequently the eects on the traded sector are
smaller. We observe that the production of the traded sector declines after the oil-shock,
however the decrease of 0:008% is lower than in the previous case, 0:1%. Thus, it has
avoided the Dutch disease eects.
We argue that the adoption of a stabilization Fund, like the one created in Norway, is a
good measure to avoid volatility and the Dutch disease eects.
3.3.3 Dividend program
In this section, we consider the case where the extra-oil revenue is deposited in a Fund,
and the return on the Fund is transferred to the households. We set an initial value of
the Fund-GDP ratio of 60%. Figure 3.4 illustrate impulse responses to one percentage
temporary increase in oil revenue.
After the oil shock, we observe that the value of the Fund increases until the boom
is over. One percentage temporary increase in oil revenue causes a 0:75 percentage
permanent increase in the value of the Fund. In contrast to the stabilization Fund policy,
government is not aected by the oil shock. The return on the Fund is transferred to
households.
Households face a permanent increase in their income; hence, they increase the demand
of traded and non-traded goods. Given that the share of traded and non-traded goods
in the consumption basket of households and government is the same, we obtain similar
results as in the previous case.
The higher demand of non-traded goods leads to increased production. Capital cannot
adjust instantaneously to the shock, thus the real exchange rate appreciates in the short-
run. As capital reaches the new steady state the relative price returns to its initial value.
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The appreciation of the real exchange rate raises wages due to a higher marginal product
of labor.
Similar to the Stabilization Fund policy, the eects of an oil shock are softened with
a dividend program. Real exchange rate appreciation is very low, 0:0016%, hence,
the traded sector does not decline so much, 0:008%. The eects on the economy are
permanent, avoiding high volatility which characterize economies with oil revenues.
3.4 Conclusion
Oil is the largest source of government revenue in many countries. Most of them are
highly dependent on this revenue; hence, the economic performance of these countries
depend on the way that oil revenue is managed.
In this chapter, we analyse from a theoretical point of view, the consequences of adopting
dierent scal policies. Particularly, we analyse three dierent scal policies. In the rst
case, oil revenue is employed to increase government consumption. In the second case,
oil revenue is deposited in a Fund and government consumes only the returns on the
Fund. In the third case, oil revenue is deposited in a Fund and the return on the Fund
is transferred to households.
We observe that Stabilization Funds, like the ones adopted in Norway and Alaska (the
second and third cases), help to soften the eects of an oil boom. There are two positive
consequences of adopting a Stabilization Fund. First, it reduces volatility of the main
macroeconomic variables in the economy. Second, the decline of the traded sector is
lower, and thus, Dutch disease eects are avoided.
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Figure 3.2: Increase in Government spending
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Figure 3.3: Stabilization Fund
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Figure 3.4: Dividend Program





Optimal Fiscal Policy: Lessons
from Mexico
In a number of oil-exporting countries, oil revenue represents an important share of
government revenue. These countries face a challenge from the fact that oil revenue is
exhaustible. In this context, scal policy represents a key instrument for an optimal
wealth distribution between current and future generations. Models based on Fried-
man's (1957) permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) provide a possible path to ensure a
fair intergenerational use of resource wealth. However, although the main insights of
these models are sound, they ignore essential features of resource-rich countries. In this
chapter further reality is added by including productive government spending and Dutch
disease eects. We nd that a higher share of oil revenue should be spent upfront when
government spending eects overcome Dutch disease eects. This approach is applied
to Mexico.
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4.1 Introduction
Oil-exporting countries face the challenge that oil revenue is exhaustible. For many
governments of these countries, oil revenue represents the most important source of
revenue. In this context, it is essential to assess whether oil revenue is managed properly.
A priori it seems optimal that oil-exporting countries should save a share of their current
oil revenue so that future generations can benet from oil wealth. But, how much should
be saved?
Empirical evidence suggests that governments with a large share of oil revenue in their
budget show overall scal surpluses. This is especially true in periods when oil prices are
high. In 2005, the governments of countries such as Algeria, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia
showed overall surpluses above 10% of GDP (Table 1). However, given that oil revenue
is not forever, a scal assessment based on the overall scal balance can be misleading.
It looks more adequate to assess scal stance by evaluating their non-oil balance. Apart
from Norway, most of the oil-producing countries show high non-oil decits. That is,
when we do not count oil revenue, government spending is considerably above their
revenue. If new oil reserves are not found, in countries such as Mexico, Ecuador and
Algeria, the current reserves will deplete in the near future. The question is whether
these countries will be able to keep non-oil decits when oil reserves deplete.
The large reliance on oil revenue and the exhaustible nature of oil reserves obligate oil-
producing countries to be particularly prudent in their designs of scal policies and to
take a long-term view. If oil reserves were limitless, governments could simply consume
oil revenues directly. Given that oil reserves are exhaustible, governments should take
a long-run view. A forward-looking scal strategy is necessary, so that governments do
not need to adjust drastically their consumption when oil reserves deplete.
The literature on optimal scal policy in countries endowed with exhaustible natural
resources has typically been based on Friedman's (1957) permanent-income hypothesis.
Within this framework, government consumption should be limited to the permanent
income 1. Thus, given that oil is exhaustible, government should accumulate enough
assets to nance the non-oil decit once oil revenue dries up. Decisions on the non-
oil decit should be based on assessments of government wealth (including oil wealth),
1See, for instance, Davids et al. (2002), Barnett and Ossowski (2003), Segura (2006), Leigh and
Olters (2006), Basdevant (2008)
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rather than merely on current oil income. Although the main insights of these models
are sound, they ignore essential problems of resource rich countries.
Table 4.1: Data from governments in oil-exporting countries (2005)
Oil rev Overall balance Non-oil balance Depletion2
/Total rev /GDP /GDP (years)
Norway 31% 16% -1% 8
Mexico 37% -1% -7% 10
Algeria 76% 12% -19% 15
Ecuador 24% 2% -5% 23
Nigeria 85% 11% -22% 40
Saudi Arabia 91% 18% -25% 68
Venezuela 58% 2% -18% 78
The aim of this chapter is to enrich previous models by adding features particular to
resource-rich countries. To be precise, we include productive government spending and
Dutch disease eects. We assume that government consumption not only yields utility
but also increases productivity. Thus, non-oil GDP will be positively aected by higher
government spending. This interpretation of government spending is consistent with the
broadly shared view that government spending on social (e.g., health and education) and
physical infrastructure raises productivity3. This is also the basis for the claim by the
governments in resource-rich developing countries that they should spend more of the
resource endowment upfront, when the marginal benet of government spending is likely
to be higher than the return from external nancial assets.
On the other hand, we also consider Dutch disease eects. The idea behind the Dutch
disease is that the exploitation of natural resources shifts production factors from the
traded to the non-traded sector. If we consider that most of economic growth is caused
by technological progress acquired through learning-by-doing (LBD) which is mainly
present in the traded sector, a decline in that sector may lower growth. This has been
the most widespread argument for the poor economic performance of resource rich coun-
tries4. Thus, the literature based on the Dutch disease argues that the optimal share of
national wealth consumed in each period should be adjusted downwards.
2Keeping current oil production, the number of years before oil depletes, if new oil reserves are not
found
3Evidence of a growth-enhancing eect of government spending can be found in Cashin (1995), Miller
and Tsoukis (2001), Gupta, et al. (2002), and Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (2000).
4See, for instance, van Wijnbergen (1984), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason et. al. (1999)
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To analyze the optimal scal policy in a resource-rich country with productive govern-
ment spending and Dutch disease eects, we follow a similar framework developed by
Matsen and Torvik (2005). We consider a small open economy that produces traded,
non-traded and public goods. In contrast to Matsen and Torvik (2005), we consider that
the dynamics of productivity are not only driven by the traded sector (Dutch disease
eects) but also by public goods. The government is the only agent in the economy that
has access to capital markets. Therefore, only the government can move resources over
time. The governments objective is to maximize households' utility, yielded by traded,
non-traded and public goods, subject to national wealth (oil and non-oil wealth).
The present model is relevant for a current debate on the need for scal rules in resource-
rich countries. There is a general agreement on the desirability of accumulating funds
to avoid sharp declines in government consumption. Including endogenous eects on
productivity growth, our model prescribes a dierent spending path from what the
permanent income hypothesis would imply. On the one hand, productive government
spending induces higher spending in the rst periods, so households can benet from
higher productivity in the future. On the other hand, Dutch disease eects lead to post-
pone the use of oil revenue, and thus, avoid the decline of the traded sector. Therefore,
we nd that the optimal spending path will depend on which of these two eects is
stronger.
We apply the model to Mexican economy, where oil revenue is an important share of
government revenue. In the last few years, oil revenue has accounted for around 35
percent of total government revenue. Thanks to high oil prices, the primary balance of
Mexican government reached a surplus of 2 percent of GDP in 2007. However, the non-
oil primary balance (the primary balance minus oil revenue) showed a decit of 3 percent.
Given that, if new reserves are not found, oil reserves are to run out in 20 years, is the
non-oil decit sustainable in the long-run? We show that under the permanent-income
hypothesis Mexican government should cut the non-oil decit to around 0.6 percent of
non-oil GDP. However, when we analyze Mexican economy in a model with endogenous
growth we draw dierent conclusions. If we consider that LBD is specially present in
the Mexican traded sector and public goods are not an important mean for productivity
growth, non-oil decit should be cut more sharply. On the other hand, if there are
no LBD dierences between the traded and non-traded sector and public goods boost
productivity growth, the current non-oil decit is optimal.
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The outline of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 presents the main features of Mexican
oil sector. Section 4.3 presents the benchmark model based on the standard permanent
income hypothesis. Section 4.4 enriches previous analysis including endogenous produc-
tivity growth, where government consumption and the traded sector drive productivity
growth. Section 4.5 calibrates the model for Mexican economy and presents the results.
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Oil sector in Mexico
Oil sector is crucial for Mexican economy. Oil revenue generates over 10 percent of
Mexico's export earnings and accounts for 35 percent of government revenue. Mexico is
the sixth largest oil producer in the world and the tenth largest in terms of net exports.
However, oil production has declined in the last few years. During 2007 oil production
averaged 3:08 million barrels per day, 5 percent less than the average production recorded
in 2006. The decline is driven mainly by the depletion of proven reserves.
Pemex, the state-owned oil company, estimates proven reserves of 14:717 billion barrels
of oil. This means that, given current oil production, oil reserves would deplete in 10
years. This would provoke a downturn in government revenue which depends highly
on oil revenue. Hence, it is highly important to analyze whether current government
spending path is both sustainable and optimal in the long-run.
Pemex faces a variety of challenges in its eorts to stem Mexico's oil production decline.
Pemex sends a large share of its revenues to the government, making it dicult to
increase spending on further exploration and production. In September 2007, Mexico's
Congress approved some reforms, including a reduction in the tax rate levied on Pemex,
which will allow Pemex increase resources for deepwater exploration. However, even if
new oil elds are discovered, oil production would not recover until 2025.
Figure 4.1 shows three dierent scenarios for oil production depending on oil reserves.
The source is Pemex's annual statistics 20085, which, based on Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), divides oil reserves in three categories. In the rst scenario only
proven reserves are included (14717.2 million barrels). In the second scenario oil elds
with a probability of at least 50 percent are added (29861.6 million barrels). In the
5Oil reserves statistics can be found on the website www.pemex.com
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Figure 4.1: Oil Production in Mexico
last scenario less probable reserves are included (44482.8 million barrels). Production
path is based on EIA's International Energy Outlook 2008, which estimates a decline of
oil production until 2025, thereafter, there is a production recovery if new reserves are
discovered.
Even if new reserves are discovered and oil production can be prolonged for another 50
years, given the importance of oil revenue in Mexican economy, it is crucial to analyze
how oil revenue should be managed.
4.3 Benchmark: A Model of Permanent Income
Following Barnett and Ossowski (2003), we construct a model where the government
chooses the optimal size of the primary decit (the problem is expressed solely in terms
of spending, treating the tax rate as exogenous). Government maximizes a social welfare
function, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a transversality condition.










s.t. Bt = RBt 1 + Gt   Tt   Zt (4.2)
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 




Bt+s = 0 (4.3)
where B is government debt, R = 1+r, with r being the long-run interest rate (assumed
to be constant) and Gt government expenditure. Non-oil revenue is denoted by Tt and
oil revenue by Zt. The parameter  is the discount factor. It is assumed that there is
no uncertainty about the future.







where U0 (G) denotes the marginal utility of government consumption. Assuming that
 = r, it follows that U0 (Gt) = U0 (Gt+1). This implies that government spending is
constant over time: Gt = Gt+1 = G. Combining equation (4.4) with equations (4.2) and
(4.3) yields the optimal level of government spending:









Zs   rBt 1 (4.5)
where N is the date at which oil revenue is exhausted. Equation (4.5) implies that the
optimal policy is to smoothen government consumption over time. While oil production
is active, government saves a share of oil revenue. Thus, it is possible to keep government
consumption constant when oil reserves run out.
4.4 A model of productive government consumption and
Dutch disease eects
4.4.1 Production
We consider a small open economy that produces four types of goods: non-traded (CN)
and traded (CT) consumption goods, public goods (G) and oil (O). Oil production
requires no inputs, and total oil revenue (Z) is appropriated by the government. The
production of consumption and public goods only requires labor, which is inelastically
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supplied by households and normalized to unity. Thus, the production function of the
three goods is given by
XNt = Ht (1   t   t) (4.6)
XTt = Htt (4.7)
XGt = Htt (4.8)
where XNt, XTt and XGt represent production of non-traded, traded and public goods,
respectively. Ht denotes productivity which is equal in all sectors and, t and t are
the share of labor employed in the traded and public sector, respectively. The equal
productivity in all sectors implies a relative price equal to 1. Adding up equations (4.6),
(4.7) and (4.8) we obtain total production (non-oil GDP):
Xt = XNt + XTt + XGt = Ht (4.9)
The most important assumption in this model concerns what drives productivity growth.
Following other models of the Dutch disease as Sachs and Warner (1995), we assume that
the labor force employed in the traded sector positively aects productivity. However,
we add a second parameter to productivity growth. We consider that public spending
also has positive eects on productivity. Thus, the dynamics of productivity H are
Ht+1   Ht
Ht




where the parameters ;  0 measure the eect of traded and public sector on pro-
ductivity.
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4.4.2 Households
The representative household has not access to the capital market, so she consumes all
her income. She can neither lend nor borrow. Household's income (Yt) is composed of
after tax labor income and government transfer (Rt),
Yt = (1   )Ht + Rt = Ct (4.11)
where Ct = CNt + CTt is total household consumption which includes non-traded CN
and traded goods CT. The representative household allocates spending on non-traded
and traded goods according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Let 
 2 (0;1) be the
weight on traded goods in the utility function. The demand for non-traded goods is
CNt = (1   
)Yt = XNt (4.12)
The last equality shows that in equilibrium domestic demand of non-traded goods
matches domestic production of such goods.
4.4.3 Government
The government is the only agent in the economy that has access to the international
capital market, so foreign debt B corresponds to public debt. Consequently, the econ-
omy's current account matches government budget constraint
CAt = Bt+1   Bt = rBt   XGt + Gt   XTt + CTt   XNt + CNt   Zt
= rBt   Ht + Gt + Ct   Zt = rBt   Ht + Gt   Zt + Rt
(4.13)
where r is a constant exogenous real interest rate. The rst equality in the second row
follows from using (4.9), and the last equality is obtained using (4.11). Notice that the
last equality is the government budget constraint. Government nances public goods
(Gt) and transfers (Rt) through income taxes (), oil revenue (Zt) and debt.
The governments role in the economy is to allocate public goods and lump-sum transfers
over time. We assume a benevolent government, whose horizon is M periods. When
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government takes a decision, it considers the eects on future productivity. The objective









(	logGt + logCt) (4.14)
subject to the economy's current account (4.13) and the dynamics of productivity (4.10),
where the parameter, 	  0, measures the relative importance of both public and
consumption goods.
Following Matsen and Torvik (2005), the problem is more easily analyzed by merging
(4.10) and (4.13) into one constraint, describing the dynamics of national wealth. At
the start of period t + 1, the national wealth NW is















It includes debt B accumulated through period t plus the present value of current and
future income, both non-oil GDP and oil wealth. For later use, we rewrite (4.15) as















Zs   (1 + r)Zt = (1 + r)(NWt   Gt   Ct)
(4.16)
In choosing the optimal path, the government takes into account that the labor employed
in the traded and public sector aects future productivity. Using (4.6), (4.11) and (4.12),
we nd that the traded sector employment is given by
t = 1   (1   








We assume that the public good is non-tradable, so production equals consumption
XGt = Gt. Thus, plugging equation (4.17) into (4.10), the dynamics of productivity can
be written as follows
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Ht+1 = aHt   bRt + cGt (4.18)
where
a = 1 + [1   (1   
)(1   )]; b = (1   
); c =    
Equation (4.18) shows the eects of both government spending and transfers on produc-
tivity. On the one hand, government transfers to households have a negative impact on
productivity. This is one of the eects associated with the Dutch disease. When house-
holds enjoy higher income, they raise consumption of traded and non-traded goods. In
order to increase the production of non-traded goods, labor must shift from the traded
to the non traded sector. Employment in the traded sector is reduced, and thus, produc-
tivity growth. The stronger the eect, the more important are the non-traded goods in
consumers' preference. On the other hand, government spending has an ambiguous ef-
fect on productivity. There is a positive eect due to an increase in public spending, and
thus, productivity growth. However, this also implies lower employment in the traded
sector, and therefore, lower productivity growth. The eect of government spending on
productivity will depend on which of these two eects is stronger.
Iterating equation (4.18), we can write non-oil GDP (or productivity) in period s > t as







Combining equations (4.15) and (4.19), we can express national wealth in period t + 1
as






































This equation replaces the two constraints (4.10) and (4.13) in the government's max-
imization problem. Notice that government transfers in period t have two eects on
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national wealth. On the one hand, there is the ordinary eect of lower future wealth; on
the other hand, there is a negative eect on future income through lower productivity
growth. Similarly, government spending in period t has two eects on national wealth.
First, government spending lowers wealth in the next period. Second, there is a positive
eect on future wealth through higher productivity growth.
4.4.4 Optimal government consumption
In this section, we present the optimal solution for the government problem. The gov-
ernment chooses the amount of public good (Gt) and transfer (Rt) to maximize the










[	logGt + log((1   )Ht + Rt)]
Subject to (4.20) and the terminal condition BM+1 = 0. Then,
J(NWt) = t + t logNWt
where










and t is an inessential function of only time. Optimal government and household
consumption is
Gt = qtCt Ct = htNWt (4.21)
where
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Equation (4.21) relates to consumption and public goods. We observe that the ratio
of consumption and public goods is determined by several parameters. Most of them
have an ambiguous eect on this ratio. However, two parameters have a positive eect
on public goods with respect to consumption goods. First, the relative importance of
consumption and public goods in the utility function, 	. It is clear that when the
public goods has more weight in the utility function (i.e., higher 	), it will be optimal
to consume more public goods. Second, the eect of public spending on productivity,
. When the public goods have a stronger eect on future productivity (i.e. higher 
and therefore higher c), it will be optimal to consume more public goods with respect
to consumption goods.
Combining equations (4.16) and (4.21) it is straightforward to demonstrate that aggre-
gate consumption grows according to
Ct+1
Ct




  1   qt

(4.24)
in optimum. The optimal consumption growth is time-varying.
Corollary 4.2. When the government has an innite time horizon, M ! 1, and in
absence of endogenous growth, ; = 0, the optimal consumption growth equals the one




Proof. For ; = 0 it is straightforward to demonstrate that qt = 	. When M ! 1,




, and thus, ht is given by
ht =

(1 + 	)(1 + )
(4.25)
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4.5 Model Calibration and Results
To simulate the optimal government spending path, we calibrate the model to t the
relevant features of Mexican economy. To establish the baseline projection for future
real oil revenue, projections for the real oil prices and the volumes of oil production are
required. The projection for oil prices is based on U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion's (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2008(AEO), which presents two scenarios. In the
reference case, real oil price6 is expected to decline until 2020, thereafter, to increase to
71.7 US dollars per barrel by 2030. In the high price scenario, real oil price is expected
to increase continuously, reaching 117.7 US dollars per barrel by 2030 (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Real oil price forecast
For future oil output, we consider the three scenarios explained in section 4.2. We take
the second scenario as the reference case. The second scenario includes proven reserves
and oil elds with a probability of at least 50 percent recoverable.
6An in
ation rate of 2 percent per year is used to convert the oil prices into real terms
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Real oil GDP is obtained by multiplying the predicted production volumes and the real
price path, net of intermediate consumption (which is assumed to remain constant at the
level of 22 percent of oil production, which is the average for the period 2000-077). These
calculations include a discount for Mexican crude oil relative to the WTI crude price,
which is also to remain constant at 23 percent (equivalent to discount factor averaged
in the period 2000-2007). Exchange rate forecasts are based on the Economists outlook
for Mexico, which foresees a rate of 12.45 pesos per US dollar in 2008 and 13.14 in 2009;
afterwards, the exchange rate is held constant at 13.14 pesos per US dollar. Fiscal oil
revenue is based on the Pemex's new tax regime, which estimates a tax rate of around
79 percent of oil GDP8.
The real interest rate, r, and the discount factor, , are set at a standard value of
3 percent. The non-oil tax rate, , is kept constant at the 2007 level of 17 percent.
The parameter 	 is set at 0:15. This implies that, in absence of endogenous growth,
households' consumption is around 6.5 times government consumption, which matches
the observed values in Mexican economy. Similarly, we set 
 at 0:46, which corresponds
to the share of non-traded goods in consumption expenditures in the Mexican CPI
basket.
Finally, each time period is one year and the government has a planning horizon of 100
years, i.e., M = 100.
4.5.1 Results
In this section, we simulate the optimal path under dierent growth scenarios. We
analyze how government decisions are in
uenced by the growth parameters  and .
We observe that high values of  lead to postpone the use of national wealth, in order
to avoid the Dutch disease. On the other hand, high values of  lead to make use of
national wealth upfront, and thus, benet from the productive government spending.
7Intermediate consumption level is obtained from INEGI's El Sector Energetico en Mexico 2007
8For a complete analysis of the new tax regime, see www.pemex.com
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4.5.1.1 Without Growth
To put the results into perspective, we display the optimal paths in a non-growing
economy (; = 0) as in Figure 4.3. As we have demonstrated above, the optimal paths
in a non-growing economy corresponds to the optimal paths under the PIH. Without
growth, government distributes national wealth homogeneously over time. Consequently,
a share of oil revenue has to be saved while oil production is active. Under the baseline
parameters and oil projections, this implies that in the next 30 years Mexican government
should obtain surpluses around 2% of non-oil GDP. The nancial wealth accumulated
during these years makes it possible to run a permanent non-oil decit of around 2%
of non-oil GDP. The depletion of oil reserves in 40 years would not pose a problem
for the Mexican government. They could keep government consumption and transfers
permanently constant, thanks to the wealth accumulated during the rst years.
Without endogenous growth, the consumption of public goods has no eects on produc-
tivity. Therefore, the choice between consumption and public goods depends solely on
the marginal utility of both goods. The optimal share of consumption and public goods
is; thus, determined by the parameter 	. Government decides to consume around 13%
of non-oil GDP and transfer to households 6% of non-oil GDP.
Figure 4.3: Optimal paths without growth (percent of non-oil GDP)
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4.5.1.2 Only one source of growth
We now analyze the optimal paths when productivity growth is driven by either public
sector or traded sector. The rst case implies  = 0 and  = 0:5%, and it is showed in
Figure 4.4. The second case implies  = 0:5% and  = 0, and it is showed in Figure 4.5.
When government spending has a positive eect on productivity growth, the govern-
ment has incentives to spend national wealth upfront (Figure 4.4). In this case, there
are no negative consequences from a smaller traded sector, since this does not aect
productivity. The government raises spending in public goods in the rst periods, and
thus, households benet from higher productivity in the future. The increase in public
goods leads to a rise in transfers. In order to keep equal the marginal utility of consump-
tion and public goods (Equation 4.21), the government transfers a share of the national
wealth to households, so that they can raise consumption.
The implications for the non-oil primary balance are straightforward. The economy
shows large decits in the rst periods, which are repaid in the last periods, when
productivity is higher. Oil revenue is spent immediately, and nothing is saved for future
generations. Although households do not benet from oil wealth in the future, they
enjoy higher productivity.
Figure 4.4: Optimal path with productive public goods (percent of non-oil GDP)
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Figure 4.5 displays the case where productivity growth is only driven by the traded
sector. Under this scenario, the government has incentives to reduce both government
spending and transfers in the rst periods. As we have explained above, government
transfers to households lead to higher demand of the non-traded goods, and thus, a
decline of the traded sector (Dutch disease eect). Similarly, government spending
moves employment from the traded to the public sector. In order to avoid a decline
of the traded sector in the rst periods, and therefore, lower productivity levels in the
future, government saves a large share of national wealth, and spends it in the last
periods, when the eect on productivity is lesser.
The consequence is that the optimal non-oil budget is balanced in the rst 20 periods,
that is, oil revenue is saved completely. The largest share of national wealth is spent
in the last periods, when there is shorter impact on productivity. The economy would
reach a decit of 20 percent of non-oil GDP in the last period.
Figure 4.5: Optimal path with Dutch disease eects (percent of non-oil GDP)
4.5.1.3 Two sources of growth
Figure 4.6 shows the optimal path of government spending, transfers and the non-oil
primary balance, when there are two sources of growth (; = 0:5%). Simulating the
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optimal path, three main results emerge.
Figure 4.6: Optimal paths with two sources of growth (percent of non-oil GDP)
First, government transfers to households grow over time, particularly in the last periods.
It is optimal to transfer part of the resource wealth to households; however, this is lower
in the rst periods. This result is the optimal response to the Dutch disease. Government
transfers imply higher demand (and supply) of non-traded goods, and thus, a movement
of labor from the traded to the non-traded sector. In order to avoid large productivity
falls due to a smaller traded sector, transfers are kept low in the rst periods. The
negative impact of transfers on future productivity is lower over time, hence, we observe
an increase of transfers in the last periods.
Second, government spending grows over time. Given that government spending posi-
tively aects productivity growth, we could expect higher spending upfront, so house-
holds would benet from higher productivity in the future. However, government spend-
ing also has a negative eect, it lowers employment in the traded sector, and thus,
productivity growth. Under the given values of  and  these two eects counteract.
Equation (4.18) shows the dynamics of productivity growth. When the parameters 
and  have the same value, the eect of government spending on productivity is null.
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 4. Natural-Resource Depletion and Optimal Fiscal Policy: Lessons from
Mexico 75
Third, given the baseline parameters and oil projections, Mexican economy can aord
non-oil primary decits in the next 100 years. It is optimal to spend relatively little of
the resource wealth while oil production is active, and thus, accumulate enough foreign
assets to keep the non-oil decit once oil revenue dries up. Given that government
spending has no eect on productivity, it is optimal to save a share of the resource
wealth for the future, and thus avoid the Dutch disease.
4.5.1.4 Sensitivity analysis
Figure 4.7: Non-oil balance optimal paths for dierent scenarios
We now analyze how the path of the non-oil primary balance is aected by changes in
our baseline values. Figure 4.7 displays the paths of the non-oil primary balance for
dierent scenarios of oil price and oil production. In the optimistic scenario, we assume
the high oil price projection and scenario 3 for oil production, that is, oil elds with a
probability of less than 50 percent recoverable, are included. In the pessimistic scenario,
we assume the baseline oil price projection, and scenario 1 for oil production, that is,
new oil reserves are not discovered. The rest of the values are the same as in the previous
section with two sources of growth.
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We observe that oil revenue has no eects on the shape of the non-oil primary balance
path. A large share of oil revenue is saved in the rst periods and it is transferred
to households as we approach period M. As we have explained in the previous sec-
tion, postponing transfers, the government avoids the decline of the traded sector and
therefore lower growth rates. The eects of the oil revenue are quantitative. Under the
optimistic scenario Mexican government could aord a non-oil decit above 4% of non-
oil GDP in the rst periods, and it would reach 11% in the last periods. Very dierent
results are obtained under the pessimistic scenario. In this case, non-oil decit should
be reduced to around 1% of non-oil GDP, and in the last 30 periods it would increase
until it reaches 5% of non-oil GDP in the last period.
Figure 4.8: Non-oil balance optimal paths for dierent values of 

Turning to the eect of the traded goods expenditure share 
, we observe in Figure 4.8
that dierent values can have important eects on the solution. High values of 
 give
a positive sloped optimal non-oil balance. The opposite slopes of the non-oil balance
paths re
ect a fundamental trade-o that the government faces in our model: on the one
hand, output growth generally implies that the early generations should receive a larger
share of oil revenue, but on the other hand, spending should be postponed because of
its negative eect on future productivity. This result implies that Dutch disease eects
are less important for high values of 
. The intuition behind this result is that a large
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expenditure share on traded goods implies a large traded sector, and thus, a high growth
potential for any given level of total demand. For high values of 
, government transfers
have lower eects on the demand of non-traded goods, and the labor employed in the
traded sector is hardly reduced. Therefore, there is little gain in future productivity
from postponing spending. However, for low values of 
, the employment in the traded
sector is strongly aected when households income increases, and therefore there are
incentives to postpone government transfers.
The eect on the non-oil balance path from a higher interest rate is the expected. A
higher interest rate provides incentives to increase savings in the rst periods. The
optimal non-oil balance shows a decit below 2% of non-oil GDP in the rst periods,
and increases until 8% of non-oil GDP in the last period. Similarly, lower interest rates
imply lower optimal savings in the rst periods.
Figure 4.9: Non-oil balance optimal paths for dierent values of r
4.6 Conclusion
The literature on the optimal use of exhaustible resources is mainly based on the
permanent-income hypothesis. Little attention has been drawn to two important aspects
of resource-rich countries. First, the fact that resource abundance may shift factors of
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production away from sector generating learning by doing (Dutch disease). Second, the
claim that government spending enhances productivity growth, particularly in develop-
ing countries, so that a larger share of the resource endowment could be spent upfront.
In this chapter, we have included these two aspects to add more reality to the normative
analysis. In contrast to the previous models based on the permanent-income hypothesis,
we nd that a constant government spending rule is not always optimal. When public
goods are the main factor which drives productivity growth, we nd that the optimal
spending path decreases over time. In opposition of PIH models, a higher share of nat-
ural wealth should be used in the rst periods, and thus, households would benet from
higher productivity in the future. On the other hand, when the traded sector is the main
factor which drives productivity growth, the optimal spending path grows over time. In
order to avoid a large shift of production away from the traded sector, government saves
a higher share of natural wealth in the rst periods.
Analyzing the Mexican economy under a model with endogenous growth, dierent con-
clusions are drawn with respect to the PIH model. Currently, Mexico can aord a non-oil
decit higher than the level prescribed by the PIH, when we consider that government
spending is the main factor driving productivity growth. Mexico should spend a large
share of its oil revenue, and consequently do not save it for future generations, since they
will benet from higher productivity. We reach opposite results when we consider that
the traded sector is the main factor driving productivity growth. A higher share of oil
revenue should be saved for future generations not only to benet them from current oil
revenue but also to avoid a decline in productivity. Therefore, in order to draw a nal
conclusion about the optimal non-oil balance path in Mexico, it would be necessary to
know the real impact of the public and the traded sector on the Mexican economy.
In assessing the optimal scal policy we have focused on the fact that oil revenue is
exhaustible. We have not taken into consideration an important feature of oil revenue,
volatility. Uncertainty about future income would imply higher savings, known as pre-
cautionary saving. We could consider two sources of uncertainty, oil reserves and prices.
One avenue for future research would involve considering this feature.




[1] Auty, R. M. (2001a), \The political economy of resource-driven growth",
European Economic Review, 46, 839-846.
[2] Barnett, S. and R. Ossowski (2003), \Operational Aspects of Fiscal Policy
in Oil-Producing Countries", in Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implemen-
tation in Oil-Producing Countries ed. by J. Davis, R. Ossowsky and A.
Fedelino, Washington: International Monetary Fund, pp.45-81.
[3] Basevant, O. (2008), \Are diamonds forever? Using the permanent income
hypothesis to analyze Botswana's reliance on diamond revenue", Working
Paper No. 08/80, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
[4] Campbell, J. and J. Cochrane (1999), \By Force of Habit: A Cosump-
tion Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior", Journal of
Political Economy, 107(2), pp. 205-251.
[5] Constantinides, G. (1990), \Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity
Premium Puzzle", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 9, pp. 519-543.
[6] Cashin, P. (1995), \Government Spending, Taxes, and Economic
Growth", IMF Sta Papers, Vol. 42(2), pp. 237-269.
[7] Corden, W.M., J.P. Neary (1982), \Booming Sector and de-
industrialisation in a small open economy", Economic Journal 92, 825-
848.
[8] Davis, J., R. Ossowski, J., Daniel and S. Barnett (2002), \Stabilization
and Saving Funds for Non-Renewable Resources: Experience and Fiscal
Policy Implicaions", IMF Occasional Paper No. 205, International Mone-
tary Fund, Washington D.C.
79
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 4. Natural-Resource Depletion and Optimal Fiscal Policy: Lessons from
Mexico 80
[9] Friedman, M. (1957), \A Theory of the Consumption Function", Prince-
ton University Press.
[10] Gupta, S., B. Clements, E. Baldacci and C. Mulas-Granados (2002), \Ex-
penditure Composition, Fiscal Adjustment, and Growth in Low-Income
Countries", IMF Working Paper No. 02/77, International Monetary Fund,
Washington D.C.
[11] Gylfason, T. (2001), \ Natural resources, education, and economic devel-
opment", European Economic Review 45, 847-859.
[12] Gylfason, T., T. T. Hebertsson and G. Zoega (199), \A mixed blessing:
natural resources and economic growth", Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3,
204-225.
[13] Hartwick, J. (1977), \Intergenerational equity and the investing of rents
from exhaustible resources", American Economic Review 67, 972-991.
[14] Kneller, R., M. Bleaney and N. Gemmell (1999), \Fiscal Policy and
Growth: Evidence from OECD Countries", Journal of Public Economics,
Vol. 74, pp. 171-190.
[15] Leigh, D. and J. Olters (2006), \Natural resource depletion, habit forma-
tion, and sustainable scal policy: lessons from Gabon", IMF Working
Paper WP/06/193, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
[16] Matsen, E. and Torvik (2005), \Optimal Dutch Disease", Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 78, 494-515.
[17] Miller, N.J. and C. Tsoukis (2001), \On the Optimality of Public Capital
for Long-run Economic Growth: Evidence from Panel Data", Applied
Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 1117-1129.
[18] Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogo (1996), \Foundations of International
Macroeconomics" MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[19] Sachs, J. and A. Warner (1995), \Natural resource abundance and eco-
nomic growth", NBER Working Paper no. 5398.
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2224Chapter 4. Natural-Resource Depletion and Optimal Fiscal Policy: Lessons from
Mexico 81
[20] Sachs, J. and A. Warner (2001), \The curse of national resources", Euro-
pean Economic Review, 45, 827-838.
[21] Segura, A. (2006), \Management of oil wealth under the permanent in-
come hypothesis: the case of Sao Tom and Prncipe", Working Paper No.
06/183, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
[22] Takizawa, H., E. Gardner and K. Ueda (2004), \Are Developing Countries
Better O Spending Their Oil Wealth Upfront?" IMF Working Paper
04/141, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
[23] Van Wijnbergen, S. (1984), \The Dutch Disease: A Disease After All?",
The Economic Journal, vol. 94, no. 373, pp.41-55.
4.7 Appendix
Proof. For the proposed value function Jt, the Bellman optimality equation is
t+t logNWt = max
Gt;Rt

log((1   )Ht + Rt) + 	logGt +
1
1 + 
(t+1 + t+1 logNWt+1)

(4.27)





























Dividing equation (4.28) by (4.29), we obtain the optimal ratio of consumption and
public goods
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  qt (4.30)
Making use of this expression and substituting for NWt+1 from equation (4.16), we
rewrite equation (4.28) as
Ct =
1









NWt  htNWt (4.31)
Substituting for C and G in (4.27) gives
t + t logNWt =
log(htNWt) + 	log(qthtNWt) + 1
1+ ft+1 + t+1 log[(1 + r)(1   ht   htqt )NWt]g
=










1+ log[(1 + r)(1   ht   htqt)]
(4.32)
Thus, the values for t and  of the proposed value function are











log[(1 + r)(1   ht   htqt)]
A general value for  can be obtained observing that M+1 = 0. Thus, M = 1 + 	,
M 1 = 1 + 	 + M
1+, etc. Iterating equation (4.33) we obtain











Therefore, we obtain an equation for Ct as a function of NWt,
Rey, Luis (2010), Macroeconomic Aspects in Resource-Rich Countries 
European University Institute
 































Economic performance of many resource-rich countries has not been as good as it may
be expected. Various literature have been trying to explain this phenomenon for many
years. In this thesis, we wanted to contribute to this strand.
The most popular explanation for natural resource curse has been based on the notion
of the Dutch disease. We enrich previous models of the Dutch disease by adopting a
dynamic framework with costly sectoral reallocation of capital between non-traded and
traded sector. Therefore, it is more costly to transform one form of existing capital
into another. This way capital becomes a specic factor for each sector in the short-run
and mobile across sectors in the long-run. Thus, real exchange rate is no longer fully
determined by the supply side and does not adjust instantaneously.
In our model, we follow Sachs and Warner (1995), and assume endogenous economic
growth. Productivity is a function of the labor employed in the traded sector. We
observe that an increase in natural resource revenues induces lower growth rates.
When an economy benets from an oil boom, households' income rises and the demand
for both traded and non-traded goods increases. Given that it is not impossible to import
non-traded goods, production of this type of goods must increase. Hence, we observe
a transfer of production factors from the traded to the non-traded sector. However,
unlike labor, capital cannot move freely across sectors. Consequently, there is a relative
increase in the price of the non-traded good with respect to the price of the traded goods
In other words, there is a real exchange appreciation. Thus, we observe that an increase
84
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in natural resource revenues induces a real exchange appreciation and a decline in the
traded sector.
The decline in the traded sector is the appropriate market response to an increase in
natural resource revenues, and it should not cause any problem in the economy. However,
under the assumption that productivity is positively aected by the labor employed in
the traded sector, a decline in the traded sector implies lower growth rates.
In this way, we can explain why some resource-rich countries may experience lower
growth rates.
However, the economic performance of some resource-rich countries has been more suc-
cessful. Not all the countries have performed badly. Hence, we analyze the tools that
may help resource rich-countries to avoid the resource curse. More precisely we study
the eects of adopting stabilization funds. Oil-exporting countries such as Norway and
the state of Alaska decided to establish a stabilization fund to isolate their economy
from oil price volatility. Although, there exists dierences between their stabilization
funds, the main mechanisms are very similar. According to the fund policy, oil revenue is
deposited in the fund and invested in a range of foreign nancial assets. Only the return
from the assets can be used for government purchases or transferred to households.
In our analysis, we observe large benets of adopting a stabilization fund, particularly,
two positive consequences. First, it reduces volatility of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables in the economy. Second, the decline of the traded sector after an oil boom is lower,
and thus, Dutch disease eects are avoided.
Finally, we explore the optimal use of natural resources given that they are exhaustible.
Our benchmark model is based on the permanent-income hypothesis. We nd that
resource rich countries should distribute resource wealth over time. Consequently, a
share of resource revenue should be saved while production is active.
However, the models based on the permanent-income hypothesis do not consider im-
portant aspects of resource-rich countries. First, resource abundance may shift factors
of production away from sectors generating learning-by-doing (Dutch disease). Sec-
ond, government spending may enhance productivity growth, particularly in developing
countries. Hence, we include these two aspects in our model.
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We observe that these two aspects have opposite eects on the way resource wealth
should be managed. Dutch disease eects induce to postpone wealth consumption in
order to avoid the decline of the traded sector. However, a higher consumption of public
goods upfront raises productivity for future generations.
Therefore, the optimal management of natural resource wealth is not straightforward.
On the one hand, when we consider that public goods are the main factor that drives
productivity growth, we nd that the optimal spending path of natural resources de-
creases. On the other hand, when the traded sector is the main factor which drives
productivity growth, the optimal spending path grows over time.
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